Pedro Mira Munoz v. Mark Lospinuso by unknown
2013 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
10-15-2013 
Pedro Mira Munoz v. Mark Lospinuso 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2013 
Recommended Citation 
"Pedro Mira Munoz v. Mark Lospinuso" (2013). 2013 Decisions. 98. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2013/98 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2013 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
CLD-429       NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 12-3578 
 ___________ 
 
 PEDRO JOSUE MIRA MUNOZ 
 
v. 
 
MARK LOSPINUSO, Acting Warden of Keogh Dwyer Correctional Facility;  
WAYNE MULLER, Office of Detention and Removal for U.S. Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement; WILLIAM JOYCE, Assistant Field Office Director,  
Office of Detention and Removal for U.S. Immigration and Customs  
Enforcement; CHRISTOPHER SHANAHAN, New York Field Office  
Director for the Office of Detention and Removal for U.S. Immigration and  
Customs Enforcement; SECRETARY OF DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 
SECURITY; ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA;UNITED 
STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, 
        Appellants 
____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the District of New Jersey 
 (D.C. Civ. No. 2-12-cv-02664) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Esther Salas
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted on Appellants’ Motion for Summary Action  
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
September 19, 2013 
 
 Before:  RENDELL, JORDAN and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed:  October 15, 2013) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
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PER CURIAM 
 Appellants (who we refer to collectively as “the Government”) appeal from the 
District Court’s order granting Pedro Josue Mira Munoz’s petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus and directing the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) presiding over his immigration 
proceeding to provide him with a bond hearing.  We will vacate and remand for further 
proceedings. 
 Munoz is a citizen of El Salvador who has been charged as removable for 
overstaying his visa and having been convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude (i.e., 
four counts of grand larceny in New York state court).  The moral turpitude charge 
subjects him to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(A) during his 
immigration proceeding, and the Government took him into such detention in June 2011, 
some four years after he was released from state prison.  Munoz’s immigration 
proceeding remains ongoing. 
 Munoz filed a counseled habeas petition seeking a bond hearing before his IJ.  He 
conceded that his crimes involved moral turpitude and normally would subject him to 
mandatory detention.  He argued, however, that the Government lost the authority to take 
him into mandatory detention under § 1226(c) because it did not do so immediately upon 
his release from state custody.  The District Court agreed, granted Munoz’s petition, and 
ordered the IJ to conduct a bond hearing.  The IJ has since done so, and Munoz was 
released on bond on July 20, 2012.  The Government appealed the District Court’s ruling 
and later filed a motion for summary action on the basis of our subsequent decision in 
3 
 
Sylvain v. Attorney General, 714 F.3d 150 (3d Cir. 2013).
1
 
 That motion is granted in part.  We agree with the Government that Sylvain, of 
which the District Court did not have the benefit when it rendered its decision, has 
invalidated the basis for the District Court’s ruling.  In that case, we held that the 
Government retains the authority to take aliens into mandatory detention under § 1226(c) 
even if it does not do so immediately upon their release from state custody.  See Sylvain, 
714 F.3d at 161.  Because the District Court’s contrary conclusion was the sole basis for 
its grant of habeas relief, its ruling cannot stand. 
 Rather than reverse the District Court’s judgment, however, we will vacate it and 
remand for further proceedings.  In addition to the argument discussed above, Munoz 
argued in his habeas petition and accompanying memorandum of law that an 
individualized bond hearing is required because the only other way to challenge 
mandatory detention is at a so-called Joseph hearing pursuant to In re Joseph, 22 I. & N. 
Dec. 799 (BIA 1999), and that Joseph hearings do not comport with due process because 
the burden of proof at such hearings is on the alien rather than the Government.
2
  The 
District Court’s ruling left it unnecessary to reach that issue.  Munoz has not claimed that 
he actually sought a Joseph hearing and was denied release on bond thereafter, and he 
                                                 
1
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, and we have jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291.  See Diop v. ICE/Homeland Sec., 656 F.3d 221, 226 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 
2
 A Joseph hearing “is immediately provided to a detainee who claims that he is not covered by § 
1226(c).”  Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 514 n.3 (2003).  “At the hearing, the detainee may 
avoid mandatory detention by demonstrating that he is not an alien, was not convicted of the 
predicate crime, or that [the Government] is otherwise substantially unlikely to establish that he 
is in fact subject to mandatory detention.”  Id.  The “question [of] the constitutional adequacy of 
a Joseph hearing” is an “open one” on which we express no opinion herein.  Diop, 656 F.3d at 
231 n.8. 
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also concedes that he is an alien and has been convicted of multiple crimes involving 
moral turpitude, so we express no opinion on whether his challenge to the Joseph 
procedure is ripe or otherwise justifiable at this time.  See Demore, 538 U.S. at 514 n.3.  
Instead, we will remand for the District Court to address this issue in the first instance 
and conduct such further proceedings as may be necessary in that regard.  In the 
meantime, the effect of our ruling is to set aside Munoz’s bond hearing and thus his 
release on bond.  See Sylvain, 714 F.3d at 161 n.12. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District Court’s order granting  
 
Munoz’s habeas petition and remand for further proceedings. 
